But OPEC’s future can no longer be measured solely by production levels or its share of the oil market. Member unity, supply security, investment, shifting demand patterns, the energy transition and the organization’s role in global energy governance are becoming increasingly important.

In an interview with Shana marking OPEC’s 66th anniversary, Seyed Ali-Mohammad Mousavi, deputy oil minister for international affairs and trade and Iran’s representative to OPEC, discussed the organization’s future and the requirements for a more effective role in the global oil market. He also addressed Iran’s position within OPEC, the departure of some members and speculation about further withdrawals, changing demand geography, investment needs, the energy transition and the prospects for broader energy cooperation.

How do you assess the historical significance of OPEC’s creation 66 years ago?

The establishment of OPEC should be regarded as one of the important institutional developments in the history of the political economy of energy.

After a decade of diplomatic efforts by Venezuela, representatives of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela met in Baghdad from Sept. 10-14, 1960. The meeting resulted in the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

The significance of that development becomes clearer when the condition of the oil industry at the time is considered. Much of the international oil industry was dominated by major international companies, while producing countries had limited influence over decisions concerning production, pricing and the development of their natural resources.

From this perspective, OPEC’s creation was not simply an effort to raise oil prices. Its underlying motivations included national sovereignty over natural resources, defending the legitimate interests of producing countries, promoting market stability and strengthening the bargaining power of developing nations.

The main legacy of the Baghdad Conference therefore lies in institutionalizing cooperation among oil producers. After 66 years, this remains one of OPEC’s most important sources of strength. Despite decades of political ups and downs, cooperation can continue to provide OPEC — and, more broadly, its cooperation with non-OPEC producers — with influence and collective leverage.

How successfully has OPEC adapted to changes in the global oil market?

OPEC’s continued operation for more than six decades is itself an important indicator of its ability to adapt to a changing international environment.

During that period, OPEC has faced the oil crises of the 1970s, oversupply in the 1980s, economic and financial crises, wars and geopolitical developments, the rise of U.S. shale production, the oil-price collapse of 2014-16 and, ultimately, the unprecedented shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Perhaps the most important institutional development for OPEC in the past decade was the Declaration of Cooperation between OPEC members and major non-OPEC producers in December 2016, a mechanism that later became known as OPEC+.

Under the initial 2016 agreement, OPEC members committed to cutting production by about 1.2 million barrels per day, while participating non-OPEC producers agreed to reduce output by 558,000 barrels per day. Together, the measures represented an adjustment of nearly 1.8 million barrels per day aimed at restoring stability to the oil market.

This experience demonstrated that managing a market of today’s size and complexity is no longer possible solely within OPEC’s formal membership. Cooperation with major producers outside the organization has become essential.

The mechanism remains active. In 2026, participating countries have continued to emphasize coordination and production monitoring, while the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee remains one of the principal mechanisms for monitoring the market and countries’ compliance with production agreements.

What is OPEC’s real weight in today’s oil market? Has its influence declined?

A distinction must be made between a decline in relative market share and the disappearance of market influence. Statistics provide a clearer picture.

According to the latest OPEC Secretariat data, global crude oil production reached about 74.85 million barrels per day in 2025, up approximately 2.24 million barrels per day from the previous year.

The combined output of OPEC’s 12 members, including the UAE, averaged 27.47 million barrels per day in 2025, accounting for about 37% of global crude oil production. OPEC accounted for roughly 55% of the increase in global crude oil production that year. Following the UAE’s departure from the organization in May 2026, OPEC’s share of 2025 global production would be about 31%.

At the same time, the emergence of new producers in the Americas, including Guyana and Argentina, and particularly the growth of U.S. shale production, means OPEC is no longer the virtually uncontested player it once was.

OPEC members exported an average of about 19.85 million barrels per day of crude oil in 2025, up 850,000 barrels per day from the previous year. More important is the geographical direction of that trade. About 14.79 million barrels per day, or nearly three-quarters of OPEC members’ crude exports, went to Asian markets.

These figures point to a major structural transformation: the center of gravity of oil demand has gradually shifted from Western developed economies toward Asia and developing economies.

OPEC’s power, therefore, has not disappeared, but its nature has changed to some extent. Today, OPEC’s influence derives not only from its production share, but from the combination of production capacity, its contribution to annual production growth, reserves, its ability to adjust supply, cooperation with OPEC+ countries and its capacity to coordinate major oil producers.

What message does the UAE’s departure from OPEC send about the organization’s future?

The first point is that the development should be taken seriously because the UAE was not a marginal producer. It produced an average of about 3.4 million barrels per day of crude oil in 2025, while its effective production capacity was estimated at about 4.2 million barrels per day.

The departure of a producer with such capacity once again highlights an old question: How can OPEC balance collective interests with the different priorities of its members?

Member states differ in production capacity, population, budgetary needs, economic development, reserves, foreign relations and geopolitical constraints. It is natural that a country with substantial spare capacity may not have the same view of production policy as a country facing production restrictions or sanctions.

But the key point is that when a country with significant oil capacity accepts production restrictions, it also benefits from the cohesion of OPEC+ and from the group’s decisions to maintain stability in the global oil market.

At the same time, the priorities of some countries have changed over time because of domestic and external factors. Such changes can determine whether a country remains in an international alliance, as we saw with Qatar several years ago and are now seeing with the UAE. Tomorrow, the same issue could arise regarding Iraq and Venezuela, two founding members of OPEC.

Recognizing this reality, one of OPEC’s most important indicators of strength over the next decade will not simply be the number of members, but its ability to build consensus and prevent differences in interests from becoming institutional divisions. This is a serious and immediate priority for OPEC.

 What is your assessment of developments in Venezuela and reports that it could leave OPEC?

Venezuelan officials have not yet announced an official position on Bloomberg’s report concerning the country’s possible departure from OPEC. Therefore, this appears to be more of a media speculation or an initial idea.

Venezuela’s current circumstances are unusual because of what we regard as illegal U.S. intervention and the abduction of the country’s legitimate president. Its possible departure cannot therefore be attributed to traditional reasons such as disagreements over quotas or changes in oil trade.

Given Venezuela’s historical role and position in OPEC, it appears that the Venezuelan government and people want to maintain their presence and role in the organization. The country’s enormous oil reserves and production potential give it the ability to remain an important and key OPEC member.

 Beyond cohesion, what is the most important structural change facing OPEC?

According to the OPEC Secretariat, global oil demand rose by about 1.3 million barrels per day in 2025 to 105.15 million barrels per day, accounting for about 30% of global energy demand.

These figures show that oil remains, as it has for roughly a century, one of the principal energy carriers in many countries. But one of the most important developments on the demand side is the changing geography of global oil and energy consumption.

As noted, about 14.79 million barrels per day of OPEC members’ crude exports went to Asia in 2025. Growth in global oil demand has also occurred primarily in non-OECD regions, including India, China, West Asia, Africa and Latin America. This shift in the center of oil consumption is expected to intensify over the next two decades.

This trend has strategic importance for OPEC. Future energy relations will increasingly develop along the axis linking producers in West Asia with consumers in Asia. Consequently, dialogue with major Asian consumers, security of oil transportation routes, Asian refining capacity and joint downstream investment could become as important as production policy.

OPEC in the future therefore cannot simply be an organization that decides on increases or reductions of several hundred thousand barrels per day. It must increasingly consider developments across the entire energy value chain, as well as the policies and requirements of emerging major consumers.

 What threat do the energy transition and climate policies pose to OPEC?

This may be the most complex long-term issue facing the organization because there is no global consensus among international energy institutions and experts regarding the future trajectory of oil demand.

On one hand, decarbonization policies, electric vehicles, greater energy efficiency and renewable energy could slow the growth of fossil-fuel consumption, including oil. On the other hand, population growth, urbanization and rising energy consumption in developing economies will continue to support energy demand.

In OPEC’s World Oil Outlook 2026, global oil demand is projected to reach about 124 million barrels per day by 2050. OPEC also expects total global energy demand to increase by about 23% through 2050.

From OPEC’s perspective, therefore, the central issue is not the “end of oil,” but how to simultaneously achieve three key objectives within a sustainable global energy system: energy security, energy access and affordability, and lower greenhouse gas emissions.

It should be emphasized that this is OPEC’s scenario. Other international institutions may have different estimates regarding the pace of the energy transition and the future of oil demand.

These differences between scenarios are themselves a major strategic uncertainty for producing countries. They can discourage sufficient investment in the oil industry, potentially creating serious risks for global energy security.

 What role does investment play in this equation?

Investment is one of the most important issues that could change OPEC’s role in the oil market — or, more broadly, the energy market — in coming years.

According to OPEC’s World Oil Outlook 2026, the oil industry, including upstream, midstream and downstream operations, will require about $17.7 trillion in cumulative investment between 2026 and 2050. That amounts to more than $700 billion annually.

This is not simply about developing new fields. Existing fields also face natural production declines, and without continued investment, supply capacity will fall.

Investment has fluctuated in recent years. According to credible sources, total investment in the oil and gas industries reached about $650 billion in 2025. While that figure is an initial estimate, it indicates that investment in oil remains below what is needed to maintain and expand production capacity and meet global demand.

That gap points to a larger challenge: ensuring adequate and sustainable energy supply in the years ahead.

One of producers’ main concerns is that if investment in oil declines faster than actual demand, the market could eventually face capacity shortages, higher prices and greater instability instead of oversupply.

Under these circumstances, the definition of market stability must also expand. Stability is not merely a short-term balance between supply and demand. It also includes investment security, future production capacity, refining capacity, transportation security and supply-chain resilience.

 Is this where OPEC can evolve from an oil organization into an energy-governance institution?

Exactly. Perhaps the most important question facing OPEC as it enters its seventh decade is not whether it can continue to influence oil prices, but what kind of institution it wants to be in the future energy system.

Signs of this transformation are already visible. In recent years, cooperation among producers has expanded beyond production coordination to include technology, investment, policymaking and energy regulations.

For example, in July 2026, the first meeting of the Technical Committee of the Charter of Cooperation was held in Baku with representatives of more than 20 oil-producing countries. Its agenda included market fundamentals, energy dialogue, technology and innovation, investment, policies and regulations, and industrial standards.

This development is significant because it shows that the institutional capacity built around OPEC can gradually evolve from production coordination toward broader energy cooperation.

How should the concept of market stability be redefined?

The traditional definition of market stability has largely revolved around three variables: supply, demand and oil inventories. Another important variable arising from these factors is spare production capacity, particularly among OPEC members. These variables remain fundamental.

In the next decade, however, market stability should include at least several additional elements: supply security, energy transportation-route security, adequate investment, spare production capacity, refining capacity, supply-chain resilience, sanctions and trade restrictions, geopolitical risks and the impact of climate policies.

For example, global refining capacity reached about 103.66 million barrels per day in 2025, while refinery throughput was about 86.89 million barrels per day. This shows that analyzing the oil market solely through the upstream production sector is incomplete. Refining and logistical bottlenecks can also create instability.

As we are seeing today, logistical disruptions have caused severe volatility in refined-product markets. Jet fuel and diesel prices in the U.S. have reached about $4.50 per gallon, their highest level in six months and about $1.60 per gallon higher than in June.

In European markets, jet-fuel prices have also risen by more than 100% in recent weeks, increasing from about $830 per metric ton before the third imposed war to more than $1,500 per ton.

Such instability can have consequences for countries’ energy security that are even more significant than volatility in the crude oil market.

OPEC therefore needs to expand the analytical capacity of its Secretariat beyond daily oil supply-and-demand balances if it is to maintain its analytical relevance.

As one of OPEC’s five founding members, what is Iran’s position in this discussion?

Iran is important to OPEC and future energy interactions for two reasons: its historical position as one of the organization’s five founders and the size of its hydrocarbon reserves.

According to official OPEC statistics for 2024, Iran had about 208.6 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves and about 33.99 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. Despite sanctions and various restrictions, Iran’s crude oil production was reported at about 3.26 million barrels per day that year.

Iran’s resource base therefore makes it an important long-term player in the global energy system. But for Iran, the issue is not simply production levels and OPEC quotas. Iran is currently exempt from the organization’s quota system.

Sanctions, investment and technology constraints, and trade restrictions have placed Iran in a different position from many other members. This has made Iran’s participation in OPEC production policies and agreements more sensitive and complex.

From this perspective, one issue Iran can pursue within OPEC is the principle that the organization’s mechanisms should recognize differences among members and constraints beyond their control.

At the same time, as a founding member, Iran can play a role beyond production quotas. That role should focus on strengthening multilateralism in energy, preserving OPEC as an independent institution for cooperation among oil-producing countries and reinforcing the Charter of Cooperation.

What reforms should OPEC consider to preserve and strengthen its role?

Broadly speaking, three areas appear to deserve greater priority in OPEC’s functional reforms.

First is preserving cohesion while recognizing differences among members. OPEC will remain sustainable when its decisions reflect not only collective interests but also differences in production capacity, economic conditions, geopolitical constraints and development needs. The UAE’s departure in 2026 has highlighted this issue more than before.

Second is increasing institutional flexibility and strengthening data-driven decision-making. Today’s market is rapidly affected by technological developments, geopolitics, sanctions, trade policies and climate policies. OPEC’s Secretariat therefore needs greater capacity for scenario planning, risk analysis and early-warning mechanisms.

Third is expanding OPEC’s mission from oil-market stability to energy stability and security. This does not mean turning OPEC into a comprehensive energy organization. Rather, it means considering factors that directly influence the future oil market, from investment and technology to the energy transition and decarbonization policies.

What indicators should be monitored as OPEC enters its seventh decade?

Let me review some of the figures mentioned in this interview, because they provide a revealing picture.

Global oil demand stood at about 105.15 million barrels per day in 2025. OPEC’s 2026 outlook projects demand at about 124 million barrels per day in 2050.

OPEC members exported 19.85 million barrels per day of crude in 2025, of which 14.79 million barrels per day went to Asia. OPEC estimates that the oil industry will require about $17.7 trillion in investment through 2050.

These indicators show that OPEC’s future is not merely about production quotas and market stability. It is also about investment, supply security, the new geography of demand and the future structure of cooperation among producers.

OPEC’s strength and effectiveness in coming years should therefore be assessed through several indicators: OPEC and OPEC+ shares of global production; spare production capacity; member compliance with production agreements; upstream investment; production growth outside OPEC; Asia’s share of OPEC exports; global oil-demand trends; commercial inventories; global refining capacity; the number and cohesion of OPEC members; and the participation of producers in broader cooperation mechanisms.

Recent geopolitical developments and declines in crude oil production and exports by OPEC members in the Persian Gulf have led to claims that OPEC is losing market share and influence, or that global confidence in the organization’s ability to ensure energy security has weakened.

Our view within OPEC is that the current regional conditions and recent production declines are temporary and will not continue for a prolonged period. Once foreign interventions in the region end and stability and calm return, oil and gas industry operations in the region are expected to return to previous conditions. OPEC could then quickly restore its share of global daily oil production and exports to previous levels or even higher.

How would you summarize the message of OPEC’s 66th anniversary?

If OPEC in 1960 was a response to the imbalance of power between resource-owning countries and major oil companies, in its seventh decade it faces a different kind of imbalance: uncertainty and fragmentation in the global energy system.

Today, the energy market is simultaneously shaped by geopolitical competition, sanctions, changing trade routes, growing Asian demand, new technologies, climate policies and enormous investment requirements.

OPEC’s principal asset at age 66 is therefore not simply its barrels of oil. It is its ability to build consensus among countries with different interests.

To preserve this asset, from the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, OPEC must simultaneously strengthen three characteristics: cohesion, flexibility and foresight.

Cohesion is needed to preserve collective action; flexibility is necessary to respond to market shocks and geopolitical developments; and foresight is essential if the organization is to do more than respond to today’s market fluctuations and instead help shape tomorrow’s energy system.

Another important point is that modernizing OPEC does not mean abandoning its historic mission. It means allowing that mission to evolve within the framework of OPEC’s statute.

The concept of market stability must develop in line with new conditions. Alongside supply, demand and prices, it must address energy security, transportation-route security, adequate investment, sanctions, technology and supply-chain resilience.

Ultimately, despite the rapid changes of recent years, the legacy of OPEC’s founding conference remains valid after 66 years. Producing countries have the greatest influence when they can manage their differences and turn common interests into collective action.

If OPEC can connect this historic principle with the requirements of the 21st-century energy system, its seventh decade need not be a period of decline. Instead, it could mark the beginning of a new phase in the organization’s role in global energy governance.